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Abstract
We propose a simple change to the current neural network structure for defending
against gradient-based adversarial attacks. Instead of using popular activation
functions (such as ReLU), we advocate the use of k-Winners-Take-All (k-WTA)
activation, a C0 discontinuous function that purposely invalidates the neural net-
work model’s gradient at densely distributed input data points. Our proposal is
theoretically rationalized. We show why the discontinuities in k-WTA networks
can largely prevent gradient-based search of adversarial examples and why they
at the same time remain innocuous to the network training. This understanding is
also empirically backed. Even without notoriously expensive adversarial training,
the robustness performance of our networks is comparable to conventional ReLU
networks optimized by adversarial training. Furthermore, after also optimized
through adversarial training, our networks outperform the state-of-the-art methods
under white-box attacks on various datasets that we experimented with.
1 Introduction
In the tremendous success of deep learning techniques, there is a grain of salt. It has become well-
known that deep neural networks can be easily fooled by adversarial examples [1]. Those deliberately
crafted input samples can mislead the networks to produce an output drastically different from what
we expect. In many important applications, from face recognition authorization to autonomous cars,
this vulnerability gives rise to serious security concerns [2, 3, 4, 5].
Attacking the network is straightforward. Provided a labeled data item (x, y), the attacker finds a
perturbation x′ imperceptibly similar to x but misleading enough to cause the network to output a
label different from y. By far, the most effective way of finding such a perturbation (or adversarial
example) is by exploiting the gradient information of the network with respect to its input; the
gradient indicates how to perturb x to trigger the maximal change of y.
The defense, however, is challenging. Recent studies showed that adversarial examples always
exist if one tends to pursue a high classification accuracy—adversarial robustness seems at odds
with the accuracy [6, 7, 8, 9]. This intrinsic difficulty of eliminating adversarial examples suggests
an alternative path: can we design a network whose adversarial examples are evasive rather than
eliminated? Indeed, along with this thought is a series of works using obfuscated gradient as a
defense mechanism [10]. Those methods hide the network’s gradient information by artificially
discretizing the input [11, 12] or introducing certain randomness to the input [13, 14] or the network
structure [15, 16] (more discussion in Sec. 1.1). Yet, the hidden gradient in those methods can still be
approximated, and as recently pointed out in [10], those methods remain vulnerable.
Technical contributions. Rather than obfuscating the network’s gradient, we make the gradient
undefined. This is achieved by a simple change to the standard neural network structure: we
advocate the use of a C0 discontinuous activation function, namely the k-Winners-Take-All (k-WTA)
activation, to replace the popular activation functions such as rectified linear units (ReLU). This is
the only change we propose to a deep neural network, and all other components (such as BatchNorm,
convolution, pooling) remain unaltered.
k-WTA activation takes as input the entire output of a layer, retains its k largest values and deactivates
all others to zero. As we will show in this paper, even an infinitesimal change to the input may cause
a complete change to the network neurons’ activation pattern, thereby resulting in a large jump in the
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network’s output. This means that, mathematically, if we use f(x;w) to denote a k-WTA network
taking an input x and parameterized by weights w, then the gradient ∇xf(x;w) at certain x is
undefined—f(x;w) is C0 discontinuous.
...
Figure 1: Fit a 1D function (green
curve) using a k-WTA model provided
with a set of points (red). The resulting
model is piecewise continuous (blue),
and the discontinuities can be dense.
More intriguing than the mere replacement of the activa-
tion function is why k-WTA helps improve the adversarial
robustness. We offer our theoretical reasoning of its behav-
ior from two perspectives. On the one hand, we show that
the discontinuities of f(x;w) is densely distributed in the
space of x. Dense enough such that a tiny perturbation
from any x almost always comes across some disconti-
nuities, where the gradients are undefined and thus the
attacker’s search of adversarial examples becomes blinded
(see Figure 1 for a 1D illustration).
On the other hand, there seems to be a paradox. The dis-
continuities in the activation function also renders f(x,w)
discontinuous with respect to the network weights w (at certain w values). But training the network
relies on a presumption that the gradient with respect to the weights is (almost) always available.
Interestingly, under k-WTA activation, the discontinuities of f(x,w) is rather sparse in the space of
w, intuitively because the dimension of w (in parameter space) is much larger than the dimension of
x (in data space). Thereby, the network can be trained successfully.
Summary of results. In addition to the theoretical analysis, we conducted extensive experiments,
on various datasets (including MNIST, CIFAR, and SVHN), under different network architectures
(including ResNet [17], DenseNet [18], and Wide ResNet [19]), and against a diverse set of attack
methods (including PGD [20], Deepfool [21], C&W [22], and others).
In comparison to ReLU networks, k-WTA networks have clearly improved robustness against
gradient-based attacks. Under a mild perturbation, even without adversarial training, our networks’
robustness is comparable to ReLU networks optimized by adversarial training. This is a remarkable
advantage, as adversarial training is notoriously expensive (typically 10-20× slower than the regular
training). Furthermore, after also optimized through adversarial training, our networks outperform
the state-of-the-art methods under white-box attacks on all three datasets that we experimented with.
To promote reproducible research, we release our implementation of k-WTA networks, along with all
our experiment code, configuration files and pre-trained models.1
1.1 Related Work: Obfuscated Gradient as a Defense Mechanism
Before delving into k-WTA details, we review prior adversarial defense methods that share the same
philosophy with us and highlight our advantages. For a review of other attack and defense methods,
we refer to Appendix A.
Methods aiming for concealing the gradient information from the attacker has been termed as
obfuscated gradient [10] or gradient masking [23, 24] techniques. One type of such methods is by
exploiting randomness, either randomly transforming the input before feeding it to the network [13,
14] or introducing stochastic layers in the network [15]. However, the gradient information in these
methods can be estimated by taking the average over multiple trials [10, 25]. As a result, these
methods are vulnerable.
Another type of obfuscated gradient methods relies on the so-called shattered gradient [10], which
aims to make the network gradients nonexistent or incorrect to the attacker, by purposely discretizing
the input [11, 26] or artificially raising numerical instability for gradient evaluation [27, 28]. Unfortu-
nately, these methods are also vulnerable. As shown by Athalye et al. [10], they can be compromised
by backward pass differentiable approximation (BPDA). Suppose fi(x) is a non-differentiable com-
ponent of a network expressed by f = f1 ◦ f2 ◦ · · · ◦ fn. The gradient∇xf can be estimated as long
as one can find a smooth delegate g that approximates well fi (i.e., g(x) ≈ fi(x)).
In stark contrast to all those methods, our use of k-WTA activation is not just meant to obfuscate
the network’s gradients but to destroy them at certain input samples. More importantly, those
discontinuities are densely distributed in the input data space, and a slight change of the activation
pattern in an earlier layer of the network can cause a radical reorganization of activation patterns in
1https://github.com/a554b554/kWTA-Activation.git
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Figure 2: Different activation functions. ReLU: all neurons with negative activation values will
be set to zero. Max-pooling: only the largest activation in each group is transmitted to the next layer,
and this effectively downsample the output. LWTA: the largest activation in each group retains its
value when entering the next layer, others are set to zero. k-WTA: the k largest activations in the
entire layer retain their values when entering the next layer, others are set to zero (k = 3 in this
example). Note that the output is not downsampled through ReLU, LWTA and k-WTA.
later layers. To our knowledge, it is extremely hard, if not impossible, to effectively approximate a
k-WTA network using a smooth function. Thus, BPDA attacks can be prevented.
2 k-Winners-Take-All Activation
The debut of the Winner-Takes-All (WTA) activation on the stage of neural networks dates back
to 1980s, when Grossberg [29] introduced shunting short-term memory equations in on-center off-
surround networks and showed the ability to identify the largest of N real numbers. Later, Majani
et al. [30] generalized the WTA network to identify the K largest of N real numbers, and they
termed the network as the K-Winners-Take-All (KWTA) network. These early WTA-type activation
functions output only boolean values, mainly motivated by the properties of biological neural circuits.
In particular, Maass [31, 32] has proved that any boolean function can be computed by a single
KWTA unit. Yet, the boolean nature of these activation functions differs starkly from the modern
activation functions, including the one we will use.
2.1 Deep Neural Networks Activated by k-Winners-Take-All
We propose to use k-Winners-Take-All (k-WTA) activation, a natural generalization of the boolean
KWTA2 [30]. k-WTA retains the k largest values of an N × 1 input vector and sets all others to be
zero before feeding the vector to the next network layer, namely,
φk(y)j =
{
yj , yj ∈ {k largest elements of y},
0, Otherwise. (1)
Here φk : RN → RN is the k-WTA function (parameterized by an integer k), y ∈ RN is the input to
the activation, and φk(y)j denote the j-the element of the output φk(y) (see the rightmost subfigure
of Figure 2). Note that if y has multiple elements that are equally k-th largest, we break the tie by
retaining the element with smaller indices until the k slots are taken.
When using k-WTA activation, we need to choose k. Yet it makes no sense to fix k throughout all
layers of the neural network, because these layers often have different output dimensions; a small k
to one layer’s dimension can be relatively large to the other. Instead of specifying k, we introduce
a parameter γ ∈ (0, 1) called sparsity ratio. If a layer has an output dimension N , then its k-WTA
activation has k = bγ ·Nc. Even though the sparsity ratio can be set differently for different layers, in
practice we found no clear gain from introducing such a variation. Therefore, we use a fixed γ—the
only additional hyperparameter needed for the neural network.
In convolutional neural networks (CNN), the output of a layer is a C ×H ×W tensor. C denotes
the number of output channels; H and W indicate the feature resolution. While there are multiple
choices of applying k-WTA on the tensor—for example, one can apply k-WTA individually to each
2In this paper, we use k-WTA to refer our activation function, while using KWTA to refer the original
boolean version by Majani et al. [30].
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channel—empirically we found that the most effective (and conceptually the simplest) way is to treat
the tensor as a long C ·H ·W × 1 vector input to the k-WTA activation. Using k-WTA in this way
is also backed by our theoretical understanding (see Sec. 3).
k-WTA activation has a O(N logN) complexity since it needs to sort input values. While this is
slightly more expensive than ReLU’s O(N) cost, this activation overhead is negligible in comparison
to the matrix multiplication cost, which is a neural network’s performance bottleneck.
Remark: difference from other WTA-type activations. Relevant to k-WTA is the local Winner-
Take-All (LWTA) activation (by Srivastava et al. [33, 34]), which divides output values of a layer
into local groups and applies WTA to each group of values. LWTA is similar to max-pooling [35]
for dividing the layer output and choosing group maximums. But unlike ReLU and max-pooling
being C0 continuous, LWTA and our k-WTA are both discontinuous with respect to the input. The
differences among ReLU, max-pooling, LWTA, and our k-WTA are illusrated in Figure 2.
LWTA is motivated toward preventing catastrophic forgetting [36], whereas our use of k-WTA is
for defending against adversarial threat. While both are discontinuous, it remains unclear what the
LWTA’s discontinuity properties are and how its discontinuities affect the network training. Our
theoretical analysis (Sec. 3), in contrast, sheds some light on these fundamental questions about
k-WTA, rationalizing its use for improving adversarial robustness. Indeed, our early experiments
also confirmed that k-WTA outperforms LWTA in terms of robustness.
WTA-type activation in general, albeit originated decades ago, remains elusive in modern neural
networks. Perhaps this is because it has not demonstrated a considerable improvement to the network’s
standard test accuracy (though it can offer an accuracy comparable to ReLU [33]). Our analysis
and proposed use of k-WTA and its enabled improvement in the context of adversarial defense may
suggest a renaissance of studying WTA.
2.2 Training k-WTA Networks
k-WTA networks require no special treatment in training. Any optimization algorithm (such as
stochastic gradient descent) for training ReLU networks can be directly used to train k-WTA networks.
Our experiments have found that when the sparsity ratio γ is relatively small (≤ 0.2), the network
training converges slowly. This is not a surprise. A smaller γ activates fewer neurons, effectively
reducing more of the layer width and in turn the network size, and the stripped “subnetwork” is much
less expressive [33]. Since different training examples activate different subnetworks, collectively
they make the training harder.
Nevertheless, we prefer a smaller γ. As we will discuss in the next section, a smaller γ usually leads
to better robustness against finding adversarial examples. Therefore, to ease the training (when γ is
small), we propose to use an iterative fine-tuning approach. Suppose the target sparsity ratio is γ1.
We first train the network with a larger sparsity ratio γ0 using the standard training process. Then, we
iteratively fine tune the network. In each iteration, we reduce its sparsity ratio by a small δ and train
the network for two epochs. The iteration repeats until γ0 is reduced to γ1.
This incremental process introduces little training overhead, because the cost of each fine tuning is
negligible in comparison to training from scratch toward γ0. We also note that this process is optional.
In practice we use it only when γ < 0.2.
3 Understanding k-WTA Discontinuity
We now present our theoretical understanding of k-WTA’s discontinuity behavior in the context of
deep neural networks, revealing some implication toward the network’s adversarial robustness.
Activation pattern. To understand k-WTA’s discontinuity, consider one
layer outputting values x, passed through a k-WTA activation, and followed
by the next layer whose linear weight matrix is W (see adjacent figure). Then,
the value fed into the next activation can be expressed as Wφk(x), where
φk(·) is the k-WTA function defined in (1). Suppose the vector x has a
length l. We define the k-WTA’s activation pattern under the input x as
A(x) := {i ∈ [l] | xi is one of the k largest values in x} ⊆ [l]. (2)
Here (and throughout this paper), we use [l] to denote the integer set {1, 2, ..., l}.
Discontinuity. The activation pattern A(x) is a key notion for analyzing k-WTA’s discontinuity
behavior. Even an infinitesimal perturbation of x may change A(x): some element i is removed
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Figure 3: (a, b) We plot the change of 10 logits values when conducting untargeted PGD attack with
100 iterations. X-axis indicates the perturbation size  and Y-axis indicates the 10 color-coded logits
values. (a) When we apply PGD attack on k-WTA ResNet18, the strong discontinuities w.r.t. to input
invalidate gradient estimation, effectively defending well against the attack. (b) In contrast, for a
ReLU ResNet18, PGD attack can easily find adversarial examples due to the model’s smooth change
w.r.t. input. (c) In the process of training k-WTA ResNet18, the loss change w.r.t. model weights is
largely smooth. Thus, the training is not harmed by k-WTA’s discontinuities.
from A(x) while another element j is added in. Corresponding to this change, in the evaluation of
Wφk(x), the contribution of W’s column vector Wi vanishes while another column Wj suddenly
takes effect. It is this abrupt change that renders the result of Wφk(x) C0 discontinuous.
Such a discontinuity jump can be arbitrarily large, because the column vectors Wi and Wj can be of
any difference. Once W is determined, the discontinuity jump then depends on the value of xi and xj .
As explained in Appendix C, when the discontinuity occurs, xi and xj have about the same value,
depending on the choice of the sparsity ratio γ (recall Sec. 2.1)—the smaller the γ is, the larger the
jump will be. This relationship suggests that a smaller γ will make the search of adversarial examples
harder. Indeed, this is confirmed through our experiments (see Appendix B.6).
Piecewise linearity. Now, consider an n-layer k-WTA network, which can be expressed as f(x) =
W(1) · φk(W(2) · φk(· · ·φk(W(n)x + b(n))) + b(2)) + b(1), where W(i) and b(i) are the i-th layer’s
weight matrix and bias vector, respectively. If the activation patterns of all layers are determined, then
f(x) is a linear function. When the activation pattern changes, f(x) switches from one linear function
to another linear function. Over the entire space of x, f(x) is piecewise linear. The set of activation
patterns of all layers defines a specific linear piece of the function, or a linear region (following the
notion introduced by Montufar et al. [37]). Conventional ReLU (or hard tanh) networks also represent
piecewise linear functions and their linear regions are joined together at their boundaries, whereas in
k-WTA networks the linear regions are disconnected (see Figure 1).
Linear region density. Next, we gain some insight on the distribution of those linear regions. This
is of our interest because if the linear regions are densely distributed, a small ∆x perturbation from
any data point x will likely cross the boundary of the linear region where x locates. Whenever
boundary crossing occurs, the gradient becomes undefined (see Figure 3-a).
For the purpose of analysis, consider an input x passing through a layer
followed by a k-WTA activation (see adjacent figure). The output from the
activation is φk(Wx + b). We would like to understand, when x is changed
into x′, how likely the activation pattern of φk will change. First, notice that
if x′ and x satisfy x′ = c · x with some c > 0, the activation pattern remains unchanged. Therefore,
we introduce a notation d(x,x′) that measures the “perpendicular” distance between x and x′, one
that satisfies x′ = c · (x + d(x,x′)x⊥) for some scalar c, where x⊥ is a unit vector perpendicular to
x and on the plane spanned by x and x′. With this notion, and if the elements in W is initialized by
sampling from N (0, 1l ) and b is initialized as zero, we find the following property:
Theorem 1 (Dense discontinuities). Given any input x ∈ Rm and some β, and ∀x′ ∈ Rm such that
d2(x,x′)
‖x‖22 ≥ β, if the following condition
l ≥ Ω
((
m
γ
· 1
β
)
· log
(
m
γ
· 1
β
))
is satisfied, then with a probability at least 1− ·2−m, we have A(Wx + b) 6= A(Wx′ + b).
Here l is the width of the layer, and γ is, as before, the sparsity ratio in k-WTA. This theorem informs
us that the larger the layer width l is, the smaller β—and thus the smaller perpendicular perturbation
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Activation model Astd Arob( = 1) Arob( = 2) Arob( = 4) Arob( = 8)
ReLU
WRN 91.0% 10.1% 0.8% 0.0% 0.0%
WRN+adv 83.3% 80.0% 75.6% 66.2% 43.1%
WRN+TRADE 78.9% 76.2% 71.9% 65.8% 50.1%
k-WTA WRN-0.1 88.6% 74.6% 57.7% 36.0% 22.5%WRN-0.1+adv 73.8% 71.4% 70.0% 66.8% 59.3%
Table 1: Wide ResNet(WRN) on CIFAR with different perturbation sizes. WRN-0.1 indicates WRN
model with k-WTA activation of sparsity γ = 0.1 (without adversarial training); +adv indicates
models with adversarial training; +TRADE indicates models trained with TRADE.
distance d(x,x′)—is needed to trigger a change of the activation pattern, that is, as the layer width
increases, the piecewise linear regions become finer (see Appendix D for the theorem proof and more
discussion). This property also echos a similar trend in ReLU networks, as pointed out in [38].
Why is the k-WTA network trainable? While k-WTA networks are highly discontinuous as
revealed by Theorem 1 and our experiments (Figure 3-a), in practice we experience no difficulty on
training these networks. Our next theorem sheds some light on the reason behind the training success.
Theorem 2. Consider N data points x1,x2, · · · ,xN ∈ Rm. Suppose ∀i 6= j, xi‖xi‖2 6=
xj
‖xj‖2 . If l
is sufficiently large, then with a high probability, we have ∀i 6= j,A(Wxi + b) ∩ A(Wxj + b) = ∅.
This theorem is more formally stated in Theorem 10 in Appendix D together with a proof there.
Intuitively speaking, it states that if the network is sufficiently wide, then for any i 6= j, activation
pattern of input data xi is almost separated from that of xj . Thus, the weights for predicting xi’s
and xj’s labels can be optimized almost independently, without changing their individual activation
patterns. In practice, the activation patterns of xi and xj are not fully separated but weakly correlated.
During the optimization, the activation pattern of a data point xi may change, but the chance is
relatively low—a similar behavior has also been found in ReLU networks [39].
Further, notice that the training loss takes a summation over all training data points. This means a
weight update would change only a small set of activation patterns (since the chance of having the
pattern changed is low); the discontinuous change on the loss value, after taking the summation, will
be negligible (see Figure 3-c). Thus, the discontinuities in k-WTA is not harmful to network training.
4 Experimental Results
We now evaluate the k-WTA network under various types of adversarial attacks and compare it with
other defense methods. When reporting statistics, we use Arob to indicate the model accuracy under
adversarial attacks applied to the test dataset, and Astd to indicate the accuracy on the clean test data.
4.1 Gradient-Based Attack
We evaluate our method on three datasets, MNIST [40], CIFAR-10 [41] and SVHN [42], since they
have been extensively used in previous research for evaluating adversarial robustness.
CIFAR-10. On CIFAR-10, we use untargeted Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) attack [20] (with
random initialization for 20 iterations) to find adversarial examples that perturb image pixels (in the
range of [0, 255]) within an `∞ -ball. We test four perturbation ranges, with  = 1, 2, 4, 8 in terms
of pixel values. Before feeding the images to the network, we normalize them into [0, 1].
In Table 1, we report the results on Wide ResNet (WRN) [19] with depth 22 and widen factor 10
(WRN-22-10). We compare our method with adversarial training [43] and TRADE [7]; both are
considered the state-of-the-art defense against white-box gradient-based attacks. Here we use the
parameter 1/λ = 6 in TRADE, a value that leads to the best robustness according to their paper.
The ReLU networks in our tests are trained with stochastic gradient descent (SGD) with momen-
tum=0.9. we using a learning rate 0.1 from 1 to 60 epochs, 0.01 during 60-80 epochs and 0.001 during
80-100 epochs. k-WTA networks, without adversarial training, are trained incrementally, starting
with γ = 0.2 for 60 epochs with SGD (learning rate=0.1, momentum=0.9) and then decreasing γ by
0.005 every 2 epochs until γ reaches the desired value. When adversarial training is used, the k-WTA
networks are trained in the same way as ReLU networks, without fine-tuning.
As shown in Table 1, when  = 1, WRN-22-10 with k-WTA (γ=0.1) activation, even without
adversarial training, achieves a robust accuracy (Arob) comparable to the ReLU model optimized
with adversarial training. Meanwhile, ReLU model without adversarial training can be easily attacked
by adversarial examples. As  increases, the accuracy Arob of the k-WTA model starts to drop.
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Activation MNIST model Astd Arob SVHN Model Astd Arob
ReLU
CNN 99.4% 0.0% ResNet18 95.0% 0.0%
CNN+adv 99.2% 95.0% ResNet18+adv 84.2% 44.5%
CNN+TRADE 99.2% 96.0% ResNet18+TRADE 87.6% 42.4%
k-WTA CNN-0.08 99.3% 62.2% ResNet18-0.1 89.3% 12.1%CNN-0.08+adv 99.20% 96.4% ResNet18-0.1+adv 83.5% 73.4%
Table 2: Results on MNIST and SVHN datasets. +adv indicates models with adversarial training;
+TRADE indicates models trained with TRADE
Figure 4: Robustness changing w.r.t. γ on CIFAR. When γ decreases, the standard test accuracy (left)
starts to drop after a certain point. The robust accuracy (right) first increases then decreases.
However, when adversarial training is employed to train the k-WTA network, it outperforms the
ReLU networks with both adversarial training and TRADE.
The advantages of k-WTA networks consistently retain on other architectures (including ResNet [17],
DenseNet [18]) and against different attack methods (e.g., C&W attack [22], Deepfool [21]). Please
refer to Appendix B.2 and Appendix B.3 for details.
MNIST and SVHN. On MNIST and SVHN datasets, we test our model with perturbation size
=0.3 and =0.047, respectively, for pixel values ranged in [0, 1]. The robust accuracy are evaluated
under PGD attacks with random initialization for 20 iterations, and the results are summarized in
Table 2 and Appendix B.2.
When testing on MNIST dataset, we use a 4-layer convolutional network trained by SGD with a
learning rate 0.01 for 20 epochs. The CNN architecture details are provided in Appendix B.7, and the
k-WTA CNNs in our test are all trained from scratch without incremental fine-tuning. On SVHN
dataset, we use standard ResNet18 and the same optimization protocal as what we used on CIFAR.
Even without adversarial training, the k-WTA model already performs slightly better than the ReLU
model. After using adversarial training, the k-WTA model outperforms considerably the adversarially
trained ReLU model. Especially on SVHN dataset, the accuracy is boosted from 44.5% to 73.4%.
Varying sparsity ratio γ and model architecture. We further evaluate our method on various
network architectures with different sparsity ratios γ. Figure 4 shows the standard test accuracies
and robust accuracies against PGD attacks while γ decreases. To test against different network
architectures, we apply k-WTA to ResNet18, DenseNet121 and Wide ResNet (WRN-22-12). In each
case, starting from γ = 0.2, we decrease γ using incremental fine-tuning. We then evaluate the robust
accuracy on CIFAR dataset, taking 20-iteration PGD attacks with a perturbation range  = 8 for
pixels ranged in [0, 255].
We find that when γ is larger than ∼ 0.1, reducing γ has little effect on the standard accuracy, but
increases the robust accuracy. When γ is smaller than ∼ 0.1, reducing γ drastically lowers both the
standard and robust accuracies. The peaks in the Arob curves (Figure 4-right) are consistent with our
theoretical understanding: Theorem 1 suggests that when l is fixed, a smaller γ tends to sparsify the
linear region boundaries, exposing more gradients to the attacker. Meanwhile, as also discussed in
Sec. 3, a smaller γ leads to a larger discontinuity jump and thus tends to improve the robustness.
4.2 Black-Box Attack
Next, we evaluate the robustness of k-WTA models under black-box attacks. Note that the use of
k-WTA is motivated for defending against gradient-based attacks; it is not specifically designed for
defending under black-box attacks. Regardless, we find that k-WTA models still have better robust
accuracies than ReLU models, although with adversarial training k-WTA models do not show better
performance in comparison to adversarially trained ReLU models. However, when both k-WTA
and ReLU models are trained on clean data without adversarial training, k-WTA models (such as
ResNet18-0.08) defend much better against black-box attacks. The results are reported in Table 3.
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Activation Model Arob Astd Model Arob Astd
ReLU ResNet18 5.9% 90.9% DenseNet121 6.6% 91.1%
k-WTA ResNet18-0.18 41.9% 90.6% DenseNet121-0.18 26.5% 92.6%
k-WTA ResNet18-0.13 45.6% 89.7% DenseNet121-0.13 32.1% 91.7%
k-WTA ResNet18-0.08 50.1% 86.1% DenseNet121-0.08 37.3% 89.5%
Table 3: Results on black box attack.
(a) ResNet18-0.1 (b)ResNet18-0.1+adv (c) ResNet18 (Vanilla) (d) ResNet18+adv
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Figure 5: Gradient-based attack’s loss landscapes in k-WTA (a, b) and conventional ReLU models (c,
d). (a,b) k-WTA Models have much more non-convex and non-smooth landscapes. Also, the model
optimized by adversarial training (b) has a lower absolute value of loss.
So far the most effective black-box attack is transfer attack [23, 24], based on the observations that
adversarial examples identified in one network are likely to fool other networks trained for the same
task. To evaluate our models, we use ResNet18 trained on clean CIFAR-10 dataset as the source
model to transfer attack our models. As shown in Table 3, k-WTA models produce better robust
accuracies than ReLU models under transfer attacks. The robustness-accuracy trade-off [6] can be
also seen in the black-box attack scenario: as γ is reduced, the standard accuracy of the k-WTA
model will decrease but its robust accuracy increases. In addition, we find that when γ is relatively
large, k-WTA models achieve similar (sometimes even better) standard accuracies than ReLU models,
while maintaining better robustness. This suggests that k-WTA can be a “free” replacement of ReLU
activation on classification tasks with no performance cost.
We in addition evaluate black box accuracies under transfer attacks using other source and target
models. Besides transfer attacks, we also evaluate our method on the state-of-the-art decision-based
black box attacks, namely Boundary Attack++ [44]. In these experiments, k-WTA models achieve
considerably better robustness against decision-based attacks in comparison to conventional ReLU
models. We report the result details in Appendix B.4.
4.3 Loss Landscape in Gradient-Based Attacks
We demonstrate how k-WTA affect the attacker’s loss landscape in gradient-based attacks. Similar
to the analysis in [24], we visualize the attack loss of a model with respect to its input on points
x′ = x + 1g1 + 2g2, where x is a test sample from CIFAR test set, g1 is the direction of the loss
gradient with respect to the input, g2 is another random direction, 1 and 2 sweep in the range of
[-0.04, 0.04], with 50 samples each. This produces a 3D plot with 2500 data points.
As shown in Figure 5, k-WTA models (with γ = 0.1) have a highly non-convex and non-smooth
loss landscape. Thus, the estimated gradient is hardly useful for adversarial searches. This explains
why k-WTA models can resist effectively gradient-based attacks. In contrast, ReLU models have a
smooth loss surface, from which adversarial samples can be easily found using gradient descent.
Inspecting the range of loss values in Figure 5, we find that adversarial training tends to compress the
loss landscape’s dynamic range in both the gradient direction and the other random direction, making
the dynamic range smaller than that of the models without adversarial training. This phenomenon
has already been observed in ReLU networks [43, 24]. Interestingly, k-WTA models show a similar
behavior (Figure 5-a,b). Moreover, we find that in k-WTA models a larger γ leads to a smoother loss
surface than a smaller γ (see Appendix B.6 for more details).
5 Conclusion
This paper proposes to replace widely used activation functions with the k-WTA activation for
improving the neural network’s robustness against adversarial attacks. This is the only change we
advocate. The underlying idea is to embrace the discontinuities introduced by k-WTA functions
to make the search for adversarial examples more challenging. Our method comes almost for free,
harmless to network training, and readily useful in the current paradigm of neural networks.
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Supplementary Document
Resisting Adversarial Attacks by k-Winners-Take-All
A Other Related Work
In this section, we briefly review the key ideas of attacking neural network models and existing
defense methods based on adversarial training.
Attack methods. Recent years have seen adversarial attack studied extensively. The proposed
attack methods fall under two general categories, white-box and black-box attacks.
The white-box threat model assumes that the attacker knows the model’s structure and parameters
fully. This means that the attacker can exploit the model’s gradient (with respect to the input) to find
adversarial examples. A baseline of such attacks is the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [45],
which constructs the adversarial example x′ of a given labeled data (x, y) using a gradient-based
rule:
x′ = x + sign(∇xL(f(x), y)), (3)
where f(x) denotes the neural network model’s output, L(·) is the loss function provided f(x) and
input label y, and  is the perturbation range for the allowed adversarial example.
Extending FGSM, Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [20] utilizes local first-order gradient of the
network in a multi-step fashion, and is considered the “strongest” first-order adversary [43]. In each
step of PGD, the adversary example is updated by a FGSM rule, namely,
x′n+1 = Πx′∈∆x
′
n + sign(∇xL(f(x′n), y)), (4)
where x′n is the adversary examples after n steps and Πx∈∆(x
′
n) projects x
′
n back into an allowed
perturbation range ∆ (such as an  ball of x under certain distance measure). Other attacks include
Deepfool [21], C&W [22] and momentum-based attack [46]. Those methods are all using first-order
gradient information to construct adversarial samples.
The black-box threat model is a strict subset of the white-box threat model. It assumes that the attacker
has no information about the model’s architecture or parameters. Some black-box attack model
allows the attacker to query the victim neural network to gather (or reverse-engineer) information.
By far the most successful black-box attack is transfer attack [23, 24]. The idea is to first construct
adversarial examples on an adversarially trained network and then attack the black-box network
model use these samples. There also exist some gradient-free black-box attack methods, such as
boundary attack [47, 44], one-pixel attack [48] and local search attack [49]. Those methods rely on
repeatedly evaluating the model and are not as effective as gradient-based white-box attacks.
Adversarial training. Adversarial training [45, 43, 20, 50] is by far the most successful method
against adversarial attacks. It trains the network model with adversarial images generated during
the training time. Madry et al. [43] showed that adversarial training in essence solves the following
min-max optimization problem:
min
f
E{max
x′∈∆
L(f(x′), y)}, (5)
where ∆ is the set of allowed perturbations of training samples, and y denotes the true label of
each training sample. Recent works that achieve state-of-the-art adversarial robustness rely on
adversarial training [7, 51]. However, adversarial training is notoriously slow because it requires
finding adversarial samples on-the-fly at each training epoch. Its prohibitive cost makes adversarial
training difficult to scale to large datasets such as ImageNet [52] unless enormous computation
resources are available.
Regularization. Another type of defense is based on regularizing the neural network, and many
works of this type are combined with adversarial training. For example, feature denoising [51] adds
several denoise blocks to the network structure and trains the network with adversarial training.
Zhang et al. [7] explicitly added a regularization term to balance the trade-off between standard
accuracy and robustness, obtaining state-of-the-art robust accuracy on CIFAR.
Some other regularization-based methods require no adversarial training. For example, Ross and
Doshi-Velez [53] proposed to regularize the gradient of the model with respect to its input; Zheng
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Figure 6: Efficacy of incremental training. We sweep through a range of sparsity ratios, and
evaluate the standard and robust accuracies of two network structures (left: ResNet18 and right: Wide
ResNet). We compare the performance differences between the regular training (i.e., training without
incremental fine-tuning) and the training with incremental fine-tuning.
et al. [54] generated adversarial samples by adding random Gaussian noise to input data. However,
these methods are shown to be brittle under stronger iterative gradient-based attacks such as PGD [7].
In contrast, as demonstrated in our experiments, our method without using adversarial training is able
to greatly improve robustness under PGD and other attacks.
B Additional Experimental Results
B.1 Efficacy of Incremental Training
First, we demonstrate the efficacy of incremental training (described in Sec. 2.2). As shown in
Figure 6, models trained with incremental fine-tuning (denoted as w/ FT in the plots’ legend)
performs better in terms of both standard accuracy (denoted as std in the plots’ legend) and robust
accuracy (denoted as rob in the plots) when γ < 0.2, suggesting that fine-tuning is worthwhile when
γ is small.
B.2 Complete Results on PGD attack
In Table 4, we report the detailed robustness results for different architectures and attack configurations
on CIFAR dataset. The adversarial examples used for attack tests are constructed by PGD ( for
20 iterations with random initialization). The step size of the PGD attack is /10, where  is the
perturbation size. We experimented with different  values as shown in Table 4
On the other side, the adversarial examples used for adversarial training are also constructed by
PGD (for 20 iterations with random initialization), with the maximum perturbation range  = 8 (or
0.031 after normalizing pixel values into [0, 1]) under `∞-norm and a step size of 0.003. All the
input images are normalized into [0, 1] before fed into the network.
We find that, after optimized using adversarial training, k-WTA models generally outperform ReLU
models that are also optimized with adversarial training. In addition, a wider network (DenseNet,
Wide ResNet) performs better than a narrower one—a finding that validates our theoretical analysis
in Sec. 3: recall that Theorem 1 states that increasing network width can improve the robustness of
k-WTA models.
B.3 Other Gradient-Based Attack
In addition to PGD tests, we also evaluate our method against various other gradient-based attack
methods. Our tested attacks include C&W (`2) [22] attack, Momentum attack [46] and Deepfool [21].
We use Foolbox [55], a third-party toolbox for evaluating adversarial robustness.
In different attack methods, we have the following setups for generating adversarial examples: For
C&W (`2) attack, we set the binary search step to 5, maximum number of iterations to 20, learning
rate to 0.01, and initial constant to 0.01. For Deepfool, we use 20 steps and 10 sub-samples in its
configuration. For momentum attack, we set the step size to 0.007 and number of iterations to 20. All
other parameters are set by Foolbox to be its default values.
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Activation Model  = 0 (Astd)  = 1  = 2  = 4  = 8
ReLU ResNet18 90.9% 27.2% 5.7% 0.1% 0.00%
ReLU ResNet18+adv 83.1% 79.5% 74.6% 65.8% 42.9%
ReLU ResNet18+TRADE 78.9% 76.2% 71.9% 65.8% 50.1%
k-WTA ResNet18-0.08 85.8% 67.0% 51.3% 30.7% 17.7%
k-WTA ResNet18-0.08+adv 73.3% 70.7% 68.1% 63.2% 52.4%
k-WTA ResNet18-0.08+TRADE 70.0% 68.0% 65.2% 61.5% 51.0%
ReLU DenseNet121 91.1% 13.3% 1.5% 0.0% 0.0%
ReLU DenseNet121+adv 84.2% 80.0% 75.3% 66.8% 46.1%
k-WTA DenseNet121-0.09 89.5% 76.9% 58.5% 30.3% 8.8%
k-WTA DenseNet121-0.09+adv 79.3% 77.2% 76.7% 73.9% 66.2%
ReLU WideResNet 91.0% 10.1% 0.8% 0.0% 0.0%
ReLU WideResNet+adv 83.3% 80.0% 75.6% 66.2% 43.1%
k-WTA WideResNet-0.1 88.6% 74.6% 57.7% 36.0% 22.5%
k-WTA WideResNet-0.1+adv 73.8% 71.4% 70.0% 66.8% 59.3%
Table 4: Results on CIFAR for different perturbation size . [Model Name]-0.1 denotes k-WTA
model trained with sparsity γ = 0.1; +adv denotes model trained with adversarial training; +TRADE
denotes model trained with TRADE.
Activation Model Astd Momentum Deepfool C&W
ReLU ResNet18 88.9% 0.5% 1.0% 0.6%
ReLU ResNet18+adv 83.1% 54.3% 45.5% 54.7%
k-WTA ResNet18-0.08 86.1% 32.1% 83.5% 37.5%
k-WTA ResNet18-0.08+adv 73.3% 53.2% 72.4% 58.7%
k-WTA ResNet18-0.08+TRADE 70.0% 55.4% 72.4% 60.7%
ReLU DenseNet121 90.1% 0.2% 0.6% 1.0%
ReLU DenseNet121+adv 84.2% 52.9% 48.9% 58.8%
k-WTA DenseNet121-0.09 89.6% 26.2% 88.2% 33.4%
k-WTA DenseNet121-0.09+adv 79.2% 65.2% 78.2% 65.1%
ReLU WideResNet 91.1% 0.1% 0.8% 0.1%
ReLU WideResNet+adv 83.3% 50.0% 49.5% 56.2%
k-WTA WideResNet-0.1 88.7% 34.1% 85.70% 32.3%
k-WTA WideResNet-0.1+adv 73.8% 56.8% 71.2% 57.5%
Table 5: Other gradient-based attack on CIFAR.
In all attack methods, we use 2000 adversarial samples to evaluate the robust accuracy of each model.
The results on CIFAR and SVHN are listed in Table 5 and Table 6, respectively. The perturbation
range of all adversarial samples are clipped into the range [-0.031, 0.031] on CIFAR and the range
[-0.047, 0.047] on SVHN (while the image pixel values are normalized in [0, 1]). We also find
that in some rare cases, other gradient-based attack methods may produce a slightly higher rate of
successful attacks than PGD on our k-WTA model, but in general, PGD remains the most effective
attack method in our tests.
B.4 Additional Black-Box Attack Results
Transfer attack. We now present the detailed results under transfer attacks in black-box setting
on CIFAR (see Table 7) and SVHN (see Table 8). We find that in many transfer attack settings,
adversarially trained k-WTA models does not produce better results in comparison to adversarially
trained ReLU models. We believe that this is mainly because that k-WTA models with adversarial
training usually have slightly lower standard accuracies than ReLU models. We also find that the
particular model, k-WTA +DenseNet121-0.09+adv, has its robust accuracy under transfer attack
lower than white-box gradient-based attack. While not a general phenomenon, it seems to suggest for
this particular model black-box transfer attack is more effective than white-box gradient-based attack.
This is possible because our method is particularly motivated for defensing against gradient-based
attacks. Similar phenomena have been discussed for previous gradient-based defense methods (as
pointed out in [10]). In general, the most effective is still the gradient-based attack.
Boundary attack. We use the implementation in Foolbox [55] to generate adversarial samples
from Boundary Attack++ [44]. We set the maximum number of evaluations to 1000 while keeping
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Model Astd Momentum Deepfool C&W
ResNet18 (Vanilla) 88.9% 0.5% 1.0% 0.6%
ResNet18+adv 83.1% 54.3% 45.5% 54.7%
ResNet18-0.08 86.1% 32.1% 83.5% 37.5%
ResNet18-0.08+adv 80.7% 71.5% 82.3% 75.9%
Table 6: Other gradient-based attack on SVHN
Target Model
Source Model ReLU+ResNet18 ReLU+ResNet18+adv Astd
ReLU+ResNet18 5.9% 58.4% 90.9%
ReLU+ResNet18+adv 71.9% 54.1% 73.3%
k-WTA +ResNet18-0.18 41.9% 66.3% 90.6%
k-WTA +ResNet18-0.13 45.6% 66.0% 89.7%
k-WTA +ResNet18-0.08 50.1% 62.0% 86.1%
k-WTA +ResNet18-0.08+adv 50.1% 62.0% 86.1%
ReLU+DenseNet121 6.6% 64.8% 91.1%
ReLU+DenseNet121+adv 81.5% 64.8% 81.5%
k-WTA +DenseNet121-0.18 26.5% 71.7% 92.6%
k-WTA +DenseNet121-0.13 32.1% 70.7% 91.7%
k-WTA +DenseNet121-0.09 37.3% 67.3% 89.5%
k-WTA +DenseNet121-0.09+adv 76.9% 58.3% 79.2%
Table 7: Black-box transfer attack results on CIFAR.
other parameters as their default values. Since the query-based black-box attack is extremely slow,
we use only 1000 samples to evaluate the accuracy of each model.
In addition, Athalye et al. [10] argued that obfuscated gradient defense may result in adversarial
samples that can be more easily found by brute-force random search. Therefore, we also test our
method against random Gaussian noise attack. All attack are restricted in `∞-norm with a perturbation
size  = 8 (while the image pixel values are in [0, 255]). In the random noise attack, we use 103
random samples on each test examples. As reported in Table 9, random noise attack is not able to
find adversarial examples on either regular models or k-WTA models.
According to our experiments, we find that Boundary Attack++ can effectively reduce the accuracy
of a regular ReLU model. But replacing ReLU with k-WTA, even without the expensive adversarial
training, significantly improves the robust accuracy, from 19.7% to 66.20% as shown in Table 9. Here
k-WTA+adv also a has lower robust accuracy than ReLU+adv, mainly because k-WTA+adv in this
case has a lower standard accuracy.
B.5 Empirical Worst-Case Robustness
In Table 10, we report the worst-case robustness results on all attacking scenarios that we experi-
mented with. Here the worst-case robustness refers to the lowest robust accuracy under all attacks
(including both white-box and black-box attacks) we evaluated. As shown in Table 10, k-WTA
models with adversarial training always achieves the best performance in comparison to other adver-
sarially trained models—including models trained with TRADE, the state-of-the-art defense method
against white-box attacks.
B.6 Loss Landscape Visualization
To help understand how the sparsity ratio γ affects k-WTA’s robustness against gradient-based attacks,
we visualize the loss landscapes of k-WTA networks when different sparsity ratios γ are used, and
the plots are shown in Figure 7. The way we produce the visualizations is the same as Figure 5 in the
main text (see description in Sec. 4.3). As we reasoned in Sec. 3, a larger γ tends to smooth the loss
surface of the k-WTA network with respect to the input, while a smaller γ renders the loss surface
more discontinuous and “spiky”. In addition, adversarial training tends to reduce the range of the loss
values—a similar phenomenon in ReLU networks has already been reported [43, 24]—but that does
not mean that the loss surface becomes smoother; the loss surface remains spiky.
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Target Model
Source Model ReLU+ResNet18 ReLU+ResNet18+adv Astd
ReLU+ResNet18 8.9% 59.2% 92.9%
ReLU+ResNet18+adv 79.3% 77.9% 83.7%
ReLU+ResNet18+TRADE 79.3% 78.5% 86.2%
k-WTA +ResNet18-0.2 13.5% 78.6% 92.3%
k-WTA +ResNet18-0.1 42.4% 75.8% 89.2%
k-WTA +ResNet18-0.07 38.8% 76.4% 88.2%
k-WTA +ResNet18-0.03 49.9% 71.2% 83.5%
k-WTA +ResNet18-0.1+adv 73.3% 73.4% 82.8%
Table 8: Black-box transfer attack results on SVHN.
Defense Model
Attack Method Gaussian Noise Boundary++
ResNet18 (Vanilla) 88.90% 19.70%
ResNet18+adv 83.12% 73.31%
ResNet18-0.08 85.85% 66.20%
ResNet18-0.08+adv 73.30% 67.73%
Table 9: Gaussian noise and Boundary++ black-box attack.
B.7 CNN architecture for MNIST
Lastly, in Table 11, we summarize the CNN architectures that we used in our MNIST experiments
reported in Sec. 4.1.
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Activation Model Dataset Metric Astd Worst case Arob Which attack
ReLU ResNet18+adv CIFAR `∞(0.031) 83.1% 45.5% PGD
ReLU ResNet18+TRADE CIFAR `∞(0.031) 78.9% 50.1% PGD
k-WTA ResNet19-0.08+adv CIFAR `∞(0.031) 73.3% 52.4% PGD
ReLU DenseNet121+adv CIFAR `∞(0.031) 84.2% 46.1% PGD
k-WTA DenseNet121-0.09+adv CIFAR `∞(0.031) 79.3% 58.3% Transfer attack
ReLU WideResNet+adv CIFAR `∞(0.031) 83.3% 43.1% PGD
k-WTA WideResNet-0.1+adv CIFAR `∞(0.031) 73.8% 56.8% Momentum
ReLU ResNet18+adv SVHN `∞(0.047) 84.2% 44.5% PGD
k-WTA ResNet18-0.08+adv SVHN `∞(0.047) 80.7% 71.5% Momentum
Table 10: Empirical worst-case performance evaluation.
Layer Parameters
Input size = 1× 28× 28
Convolution output channels=128, kernel size=3, padding=1, stride=1
ReLU/k-WTA -
Convolution output channels=128, kernel size=3, padding=1, stride=2
ReLU/k-WTA -
Convolution output channels=256, kernel size=3, padding=1, stride=1
ReLU/k-WTA -
Convolution output channels=256, kernel size=3, padding=1, stride=2
Linear input size=12544, output size=10000
ReLU/k-WTA -
Linear input size=10000, output size=10
Softmax output -
Table 11: MNIST CNN architecture used in Sec. 4.1.
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ResNet18-0.3 ResNet18-0.2
ResNet18-0.1 DenseNet121-0.2
DenseNet121-0.1 DenseNet121-0.1+adv
Figure 7: Visualization of different model with different γ.
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C Discontinuity Jump ofWφk(x)
Consider a gradual and smooth change of the vector x. For the ease of illustration, let us assume
all the values in x are distinct. Because every element in x changes smoothly, when the activation
pattern A(x) changes, the k-th largest and k + 1-th largest value in x must swap: the previously
k-th largest value is removed from the activation pattern, while the previously k + 1-th largest value
is added in the activation pattern. Let i and j denote the indices of the two values, that is, xi is
previously the k-th largest and xj is previously the k + 1-th largest. When this swap happens, xi and
xj must be infinitesimally close to each other, and we use x∗ to indicate their common value.
This swap affects the computation of Wφk(x). Before the swap happens, xi is in the activation
pattern but xj is not, therefore Wi takes effect but Wj does not. After the swap, Wj takes effect while
Wj is suppressed. Therefore, the discontinuity jump due to this swap is (Wj −Wi)x∗.
When W is determined, the magnitude of the jump depends on x∗. Recall that x∗ is the k-th largest
value in x when the swap happens. Thus, it depends on k and in turn the sparsity ratio γ: the smaller
the γ is, the smaller k is effectively used (for a fixed vector length). As a result, the k-th largest value
becomes larger—when k = 1, the largest value of x is used as x∗.
D Theoretical Proofs
In this section, we will prove Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. The formal version of the two theorems are
Theorem 9 and Theorem 10 respectively.
Notation. We use [n] to denote the set {1, 2, · · · , n}. We use 1(E) to indicate an indicator variable.
If the event E happens, the value of 1(E) is 1. Otherwise the value of 1(E) is 0. For a weight matrix
W , we use Wi to denote the i-th row of W . For a bias vector b, we use bi to denote the i-th entry of b.
In this section, we show some behaviors of the k-WTA activation function. Recall that an n-layer
neural network f(x) with k-WTA activation function can be seen as the following:
f(x) = W (1) · φk(W (2) · φk(· · ·φk(W (n)x+ b(n))) + b(2)) + b(1)
where W (i) is the weight matrix, b(i) is the bias vector of the i-th layer, and φ(·) is the k-WTA
activation function, i.e., for an arbitrary vector y, φk(y) is defined as the following:
φk(y)j =
{
yj , if yj is one of the top-k largest values,
0, otherwise.
For simplicity of the notation, if k is clear in the context, we will just use φ(y) for short. Notice that
if there is a tie in the above definition, we assume the entry with smaller index has larger value. For a
vector y ∈ Rl, we define the activation pattern A(y) ⊆ [l] as
A(y) = {i ∈ [l] | yi is one of the top-k largest values}.
Notice that if the activation patternA(y) is different fromA(y′), then W ·φ(y) and W ·φ(y′) will be
in different linear region. Actually, W ·φ(y) may even represent a discontinuous function. In the next
section, we will show that when the network is much wider, the function may be more discontinuous
with respect to the input.
D.1 Discontinuity with Respect to the Input
We only consider the activation pattern of the output of one layer. We consider the behavior of the
network after the initialization of the weight matrix and the bias vector. By initialization, the entries
of the weight matrix W are i.i.d. random Gaussian variables, and the bias vector is zero. We can
show that if the weight matrix is sufficiently wide, then for any vector x, with high probability, for
all vector x′ satisfying that the "perpendicular” distance between x and x′ is larger than a small
threshold, the activation patterns of Wx and Wx′ are different.
Notice that the scaling of W does not change the activation pattern of Wx for any x, we can thus
assume that each entry of W is a random variable with standard Gaussian distribution N(0, 1).
Before we prove Theorem 9, let us prove several useful lemmas. The following several lemmas does
not depend on the randomness of the weight matrix.
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Lemma 1 (Inputs with the same activation pattern form a convex set). Given an arbitrary weight
matrix W ∈ Rl×m and an arbitrary bias vector b ∈ Rl, for any x ∈ Rm, the set of all the vectors
x′ ∈ Rm satisfying A(Wx′ + b) = A(Wx+ b) is convex, i.e., the set
{x′ ∈ Rm | A(Wx+ b) = A(Wx′ + b)}
is convex.
Proof. If A(Wx′ + b) = A(Wx+ b), then x′ should satisfy:
∀i ∈ A(Wx+ b), j ∈ [l] \ A(Wx+ b),Wix′ + bi ≥ (or >) Wjx′ + bj .
Notice that the inequality Wix′ + bi ≥ (or >) Wjx′ + bj denotes a half hyperplane (Wi −Wj)x′ +
(bi − bj) ≥ (or >) 0. Thus, the set {x′ ∈ Rm | A(Wx+ b) = A(Wx′ + b)} is convex since it is
an intersection of half hyperplanes.
Lemma 2 (Different patterns of input points with small angle imply different patterns of input points
with large angle). Let α ∈ (0, 1). Given an arbitrary weight matrix W ∈ Rl×m, a bias vector b = 0,
and a vector x ∈ Rm with ‖x‖2 = 1, if every vector x′ ∈ Rm with ‖x′‖2 = 1 and 〈x, x′〉 = α
satisfies A(Wx + b) 6= A(Wx′ + b), then for any x′′ ∈ Rm with ‖x′′‖2 = 1 and 〈x, x′′〉 < α, it
satisfies A(Wx+ b) 6= A(Wx′′ + b).
Proof. We draw a line between x and x′′. There must be a point x∗ ∈ Rm on the line and 〈x, x′〉 = α,
where x′ = x∗/‖x∗‖2. Since b = 0, we haveA(Wx∗+b) = A(Wx′+b) 6= A(Wx+b). Since x∗ is
on the line between x and x′′, we haveA(Wx′′+b) 6= A(Wx+b) by convexity (see Lemma 1).
Lemma 3 (A sufficient condition for different patterns). Consider two vectors y ∈ Rl and y′ ∈ Rl.
If ∃i ∈ A(y), j ∈ [l] \ A(y) such that y′i < y′j , then A(y) 6= A(y′).
Proof. Suppose A(y) = A(y′). We have i ∈ A(y′). It means that y′i is one of the top-k largest
values among all entries of y′. Thus y′j is also one of the top-k largest values, and j should be in
A(y′) which leads to a contradiction.
In the remaining parts, we will assume that each entry of the weight matrix W ∈ Rl×m is a standard
random Gaussian variable.
Lemma 4 (Upper bound of the entires of W ). Consider a matrix W ∈ Rl×m where each entry is a
random variable with standard Gaussian distribution N(0, 1). With probability at least 0.99, ∀i ∈ [l],
‖Wi‖2 ≤ 10
√
ml.
Proof. Consider a fixed i ∈ [l]. We have E[‖Wi‖22] = m. By Markov’s inequality, we have
Pr[‖Wi‖22 > 100ml] ≤ 0.01/l. By taking union bound over all i ∈ [l], with probability at least 0.99,
we have ∀i ∈ [l], ‖Wi‖2 ≤ 10
√
ml.
Lemma 5 (Two vectors may have different activation patterns with a good probability). Consider
a matrix W ∈ Rl×m where each entry is a random variable with standard Gaussian distribution
N(0, 1). Let γ ∈ (0, 0.48) be the sparsity ratio of the activation, i.e., γ = k/l. For any two vectors
x, x′ ∈ Rm with ‖x‖2 = ‖x′‖2 = 1 and 〈x, x′〉 = α for some arbitrary α ∈ (0.5, 1), with probability
at least 1− 2−Θ((1/α2−1)γl), A(Wx) 6= A(Wx′) and ∃i ∈ A(Wx), j ∈ [l] \ A(Wx) such that
Wix
′ < Wjx′ −
√
1− α2
24α
·
√
2pi.
Proof. Consider arbitrary two vectors x, x′ ∈ Rm with ‖x‖2 = ‖x′‖2 = 1 and 〈x, x′〉 = α. We
can find an orthogonal matrix Q ∈ Rm×m such that x˜ := Qx = (1, 0, 0, · · · , 0)> ∈ Rm and
x˜′ := Qx′ = (α,
√
1− α2, 0, 0, · · · , 0)> ∈ Rm. Let W˜ = WQ>. Then we have W˜ x˜ = Wx and
W˜ x˜′ = Wx′. Thus, we only need to analyze the activation patterns of W˜ x˜ and W˜ x˜′. Since Q>
is an orthogonal matrix and each entry of W is an i.i.d. random variable with standard Gaussian
distribution N(0, 1), W˜ = WQ> is also a random matrix where each entry is an i.i.d. random
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variable with standard Gaussian distribution N(0, 1). Let the entries in the first column of W˜ be
X1, X2, · · · , Xl and let the entries in the second column of W˜ be Y1, Y2, · · · , Yl. Then we have
Wx = W˜ x˜ =
X1X2· · ·
Xl
 , Wx′ = W˜ x˜′ =

αX1 +
√
1− α2Y1
αX2 +
√
1− α2Y2
· · ·
αXl +
√
1− α2Yl
 . (6)
We set ε =
√
1− α2/(96α) and define R′1 < R1 < R2 < R′2 as follows:
Pr
X∼N(0,1)
[X ≥ R′2] = (1− 2ε)γ, (7)
Pr
X∼N(0,1)
[X ≥ R2] = (1− ε)γ, (8)
Pr
X∼N(0,1)
[X ≥ R1] = (1 + ε)γ, (9)
Pr
X∼N(0,1)
[X ≥ R′1] = (1 + 2ε)γ. (10)
Since γ < 0.48 and ε ≤ 0.02, we have (1 + 2ε)γ < 0.5. It implies 0 < R′1 < R1 < R2 < R′2.
Claim 3.
R′2 −R′1 ≤ 8ε
√
2pi.
Proof. By Equation (7) and Equation (10),
Pr
X∼N(0,1)
[R′1 ≤ X ≤ R′2] = 4εγ.
Due to the density function of standard Gaussian distribution, we have
1√
2pi
∫ R′2
R′1
e−t
2/2dt = Pr
X∼N(0,1)
[R′1 ≤ X ≤ R′2] = 4εγ.
Since R′2 ≥ R′1 ≥ 0, we have ∀t ∈ [R′1, R′2], e−t
2/2 ≥ e−R′22 /2. Thus,
1√
2pi
· e−R′22 /2(R′2 −R′1) =
1√
2pi
· e−R′22 /2
∫ R′2
R′1
1dt ≤ 1√
2pi
∫ R′2
R′1
e−t
2/2dt = 4εγ.
By the tail bound of Gaussian distribution, we have
Pr
X∼N(0,1)
[X ≥ R′2] ≤ e−R
′2
2 /2.
By combining with Equation (7), we have
(1− 2ε)γ · 1√
2pi
(R′2 −R′1)
= Pr
X∼N(0,1)
[X ≥ R′2] ·
1√
2pi
(R′2 −R′1)
≤ e−R′22 /2 · 1√
2pi
(R′2 −R′1)
≤ 4εγ,
which implies
R′2 −R′1 ≤
4ε
1− 2ε
√
2pi ≤ 8ε
√
2pi,
where the last inequality follows from 1− 2ε ≥ 0.5.
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Claim 4.
Pr
X1,X2,··· ,Xl
[
l∑
i=1
1(Xi ≥ R2) ≥ (1− ε/2)γl
]
≤ e−ε2γl/24 (11)
Pr
X1,X2,··· ,Xl
[
l∑
i=1
1(Xi ≥ R1) ≤ (1 + ε/2)γl
]
≤ e−ε2γl/18 (12)
Pr
X1,X2,··· ,Xl
[
l∑
i=1
1(R′2 ≥ Xi ≥ R2) ≤ εγl/2
]
≤ e−εγl/8 (13)
Pr
X1,X2,··· ,Xl
[
l∑
i=1
1(R1 ≥ Xi ≥ R′1) ≤ εγl/2
]
≤ e−εγl/8 (14)
Proof. For i ∈ [l], we have E[1(Xi ≥ R2)] = Pr[Xi ≥ R2] = (1 − ε)γ by Equation (8). By
Chernoff bound, we have
Pr
[
l∑
i=1
1(Xi ≥ R2) ≥ (1 + ε/2) · (1− ε)γl
]
≤ e−(ε/2)2(1−2ε)γl/3.
Since ε ≤ 0.02,
Pr
[
l∑
i=1
1(Xi ≥ R2) ≥ (1− ε/2)γl
]
≤ e−ε2γl/24.
We have E[1(Xi ≥ R1)] = Pr[Xi ≥ R1] = (1 + ε)γ by Equation (9). By Chernoff bound, we have
Pr
[
l∑
i=1
1(Xi ≥ R1) ≤ (1− ε/3) · (1 + ε)γl
]
≤ e−(ε/3)2(1+ε)γl/2.
Thus,
Pr
[
l∑
i=1
1(Xi ≥ Ri) ≤ (1 + ε/2)γl
]
≤ e−ε2γl/18
We have E [1(R′2 ≥ Xi ≥ R2)] = Pr[R′2 ≥ Xi ≥ R2] = εγ by Equation (7) and Equation (8). By
Chernoff bound, we have
Pr
[
l∑
i=1
1(R′2 ≥ Xi ≥ R2) ≤ 1/2 · εγl
]
≤ e−εγl/8
Similarly, we have E[1(R1 ≥ Xi ≥ R′1)] = Pr[R1 ≥ Xi ≥ R′1] = εγ by Equation (9) and
Equation (10). By chernoff bound, we have
Pr
X1,X2,··· ,Xl
[
l∑
i=1
1(R1 ≥ Xi ≥ R′1) ≤ 1/2 · εγl
]
≤ e−εγl/8
Equation (11) says that, with high probability, ∀i ∈ [l] with Xi ≥ R2, it has i ∈ A(Wx). Equa-
tion (12) says that, with high probability, ∀i ∈ [l] with Xi ≤ R1, it has i 6∈ A(Wx). Equation (14)
(Equation (13)) says that, with high probability, there are many i ∈ [l] such that Wix ∈ [R′1, R1]
(Wix ∈ [R2, R′2]).
Let E = E1 ∧ E2 ∧ E3 ∧ E4, where
• E1:
∑l
i=1 1(Xi ≥ R2) ≤ (1− ε/2)γl,
• E2:
∑l
i=1 1(Xi ≥ R1) ≥ (1 + ε/2)γl,
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• E3:
∑l
i=1 1(R1 ≥ Xi ≥ R′1) ≥ εγl/2,
• E4:
∑l
i=1 1(R
′
2 ≥ Xi ≥ R2) ≥ εγl/2.
According to Equation (11), Equation (12), Equation (13) and Equation (14), the probability that E
happens is at least
1− 4e−ε2γl/24 (15)
by union bound over E¯1, E¯2, E¯3, E¯4.
Claim 5. Condition on E , the probability that ∃i ∈ [l] with Xi ∈ [R2, R′2] such that Yi <
−α/√1− α2 · 16ε√2pi is at least
1−
(
16ε · α√
1− α2 +
1
2
)εγl/2
.
Proof. For a fixed i ∈ [l],
Pr
[
Yi ≥ −α/
√
1− α2 · 16ε
√
2pi
]
=
∫ 0
−α/√1−α2·16ε√2pi
1√
2pi
e−t
2/2dt+
1
2
≤ 1√
2pi
· α/
√
1− α2 · 16ε
√
2pi +
1
2
= 16ε · α√
1− α2 +
1
2
.
Thus, according to event E4, we have
Pr
[
∀i with Xi ∈ [R2, R′2], Yi ≥ −α/
√
1− α2 · 16ε
√
2pi | E
]
≤
(
16ε · α√
1− α2 +
1
2
)εγl/2
.
Claim 6. Condition on E , the probability that ∃i ∈ [l] with Xi ∈ [R′1, R1] such that Yi ≥ 0 is at
least 1− (1/2)εγl/2 .
Proof. For a fixed i ∈ [l], Pr[Yi ≤ 0] = 1/2. Thus, according to event E3, we have
Pr [∀i with Xi ∈ [R′1, R1], Yi ≤ 0 | E ] ≤ (1/2)εγl/2.
Condition on that E happens. Because of E1, if Xi ≥ R2, Xi must be one of the top-k largest
values. Due to Equation (6), we have Xi = Wix. Thus, if Xi ≥ R2, i ∈ A(Wx). By Claim 5, with
probability at least
1−
(
16ε · α√
1− α2 +
1
2
)εγl/2
, (16)
there is i ∈ A(Wx) such that
Wix
′ = αXi +
√
1− α2Yi
≤ αXi +
√
1− α2 ·
(
− α√
1− α2 · 16ε
√
2pi
)
= α(Xi − 16ε
√
2pi)
≤ α(R′2 − 16ε
√
2pi), (17)
where the first step follows from Equation (6), the second step follows from Yi ≤ −α/
√
1− α2 ·
16ε
√
2pi, and the last step follows from Xi ∈ [R2, R′2].
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Because of E2 if Xj ≤ R1, Xj should not be one of the top-k largest values. Due to Equation (6), we
have Xj = Wjx. Thus, if Xj ≤ R1, j 6∈ A(Wx). By Claim D.1, with probability at least
1− (1/2)εγl/2 , (18)
there is j 6∈ A(Wx) such that
Wjx
′ = αXj +
√
1− α2Yj ≥ αXj ≥ αR′1, (19)
where the first step follows from Equation (6), the second step follows from Yj ≥ 0, and the last step
follows from Xj ∈ [R′1, R1].
By Equation (19) and Equation (17), ∃i ∈ A(Wx), j ∈ [l] \ A(Wx),
Wix
′ ≤ α(R′2 − 16ε
√
2pi) ≤ α(R′1 − 8ε
√
2pi) ≤Wjx′ − 8αε
√
2pi
≤Wjx′ − 4ε
√
2pi = Wjx
′ −
√
1− α2
24α
·
√
2pi,
where the second step follows from Claim 3, the forth step follows from α ≥ 0.5, and the last
step follows from ε =
√
1− α2/(96α). By Lemma 3, we can conclude A(Wx) 6= A(Wx′). By
Equation (15), Equation (16), Equation (18), and union bound, the overall probability is at least
1−
(
4e−ε
2γl/24 +
(
16ε · α√
1− α2 +
1
2
)εγl/2
+
(
1
2
)εγl/2)
≥ 1−
(
4e−ε
2γl/24 +
(
2
3
)εγl/2
+
(
1
2
)εγl/2)
≥ 1− 6 ·
(
2
3
)ε2γl/24
≥ 1− 2−Θ(( 1α2−1)γl),
where the first and the last step follows from ε =
√
1− α2/(96α)
Next, we will use a tool called ε-net.
Definition 7 (ε-Net). For a given set S, if there is a set N ⊆ S such that ∀x ∈ S there exists a
vector y ∈ N such that ‖x− y‖2 ≤ ε, then N is an ε-net of S.
There is a standard upper bound of the size of an ε-net of a unit norm ball.
Lemma 6 ([56] II.E, 10). Given a matrix U ∈ Rm×d, let S = {Uy | ‖Uy‖2 = 1}. For ε ∈ (0, 1),
there is an ε-net N of S with |N | ≤ (1 + 1/ε)d.
Now we can extend above lemma to the following.
Lemma 7 (ε-Net for the set of points with a certain angle). Given a vector x ∈ Rm with ‖x‖2 = 1
and a parameter α ∈ (−1, 1), let S = {x′ ∈ Rm | ‖x′‖2 = 1, 〈x, x′〉 = α}. For ε ∈ (0, 1), there is
an ε-net N of S with |N | ≤ (1 + 1/ε)m−1.
Proof. Let U ∈ Rm×(m−1) have orthonormal columns and Ux = 0. Then S can be represented as
S = {α · x+
√
1− α2 · Uy | y ∈ Rm−1, ‖Uy‖2 = 1}.
Let
S ′ = {Uy | y ∈ Rm−1, ‖Uy‖2 = 1}.
According to Lemma 6, there is an ε-net N ′ of S ′ with size |N ′| ≤ (1 + 1/ε)m−1. We construct N
as following:
N = {α · x+
√
1− α2 · z | z ∈ N ′}.
It is obvious that |N | = |N ′| ≤ (1 + 1/ε)m−1. Next, we will show that N is indeed an ε-net of S.
Let x′ be an arbitrary vector from S . Let x′ = α · x+√1− α2 · z for some z ∈ S ′. There is a vector
(α · x+√1− α2 · z′) ∈ N such that z′ ∈ N ′ and ‖z − z′‖2 ≤ ε. Thus, we have
‖x′ − (α · x+
√
1− α2 · z′)‖2 =
√
1− α2‖z − z′‖2 ≤ ε.
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Theorem 8 (Rotating a vector a little bit may change the activation pattern). Consider a weight matrix
W ∈ Rl×m where each entry is an i.i.d. sample drawn from the Gaussian distribution N(0, 1/l). Let
γ ∈ (0, 0.48) be the sparsity ratio of the activation function, i.e., γ = k/l. With probability at least
0.99, it has ∀i ∈ [l], ‖Wi‖2 ≤ 10
√
m. Condition on that ∀i ∈ [l], ‖Wi‖2 ≤ 10
√
m happens, then,
for any x ∈ Rm and α ∈ (0.5, 1), if
l ≥ C ·
(
m+ log(1/δ)
γ
· 1
1− α2
)
· log
(
m+ log(1/δ)
γ
· 1
1− α2
)
for a sufficiently large constantC, with probability at least 1−δ ·2−m, ∀x′ ∈ Rm with 〈x,x′〉‖x‖2‖x′‖2 ≤ α,
A(Wx) 6= A(Wx′).
Proof. Notice that the scale of W does not affect the activation pattern of Wx for any x ∈ Rm. Thus,
we assume that each entry of W is a standard Gaussian random variable in the remaining proof, and
we will instead condition on ∀i ∈ [l], ‖Wi‖2 ≤ 10
√
ml. The scale of x or x′ will not affect 〈x,x
′〉
‖x‖2‖x′‖2 .
It will not affect the activation pattern either. Thus, we assume ‖x‖2 = ‖x′‖2 = 1.
By Lemma 4, with probability at least 0.99, we have ∀i ∈ [l], ‖Wi‖2 ≤ 10
√
ml.
Let
S = {y ∈ Rm | ‖y‖2 = 1, 〈x, y〉 = α}.
Set
ε =
√
2pi(1− α2)
720α
√
ml
.
By Lemma 7, there is an ε-net N of S such that
|N | ≤
(
1 +
720α
√
ml√
2pi(1− α2)
)m
.
By Lemma 5, for any y ∈ N , with probability at least
1− 2−Θ((1/α2−1)γl),
∃i ∈ A(Wx), j ∈ [l] \ A(Wx) such that
Wiy < Wjy −
√
1− α2
24α
·
√
2pi.
By taking union bound over all y ∈ N , with probability at least
1− |N | · 2−Θ((1/α2−1)γl)
≥ 1−
(
1 +
720α
√
ml√
2pi(1− α2)
)m
2−Θ((
1
α2
−1)γl)
≥ 1−
(
1000 ·
√
ml√
1− α2
)m
2−Θ((
1
α2
−1)γl)
≥ 1−
(
1000 ·
√
ml√
1− α2
)m
2
−C′·( 1
α2
−1)γ·m+log(1/δ)γ · α
2
1−α2 ·log
(
ml
1−α2
)
// C ′ is a sufficiently large constant
= 1−
(
1000 ·
√
ml√
1− α2
)m
2
−C′ ·(m+log(1/δ))·log
(
ml
1−α2
)
≥ 1− δ · 2−m,
the following event E ′ happens: ∀y ∈ N ,∃i ∈ A(Wx), j ∈ [l] \ A(Wx) such that
Wiy < Wjy −
√
1− α2
24α
·
√
2pi.
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In the remaining of the proof, we will condition on the event E ′. Consider y′ ∈ S. Since N is an
ε-net of S, we can always find a y ∈ N such that
‖y − y′‖2 ≤ ε =
√
2pi(1− α2)
720α
√
ml
.
Since event E ′ happens, we can find i ∈ A(Wx) and j ∈ [l] \ A(Wx) such that
Wiy < Wjy −
√
1− α2
24α
·
√
2pi.
Then, we have
Wiy
′ = Wiy +Wi(y′ − y)
< Wjy −
√
1− α2
24α
·
√
2pi + ‖Wi‖2‖y′ − y‖2
≤Wjy −
√
1− α2
24α
·
√
2pi + 10
√
ml ·
√
2pi(1− α2)
720α
√
ml
= Wjy −
√
1− α2
36α
·
√
2pi
= Wjy
′ +Wj(y − y′)−
√
1− α2
36α
·
√
2pi
≤Wjy′ + ‖Wj‖2‖y − y′‖2 −
√
1− α2
36α
·
√
2pi
≤Wjy′ + 10
√
ml ·
√
2pi(1− α2)
720α
√
ml
−
√
1− α2
36α
·
√
2pi
≤Wjy′ −
√
1− α2
72α
·
√
2pi,
where the second step follows from Wiy < Wjy −
√
1− α2/(24α) · √2pi and Wi(y′ −
y) ≤ ‖Wi‖2‖y′ − y‖2, the third step follows from ‖Wi‖2 ≤ 10
√
ml and ‖y′ − y‖2 ≤√
2pi(1− α2)/(720α√ml), the sixth step follows from Wj(y − y′) ≤ ‖Wj‖2‖y − y′‖2, and the
seventh step follows from ‖Wi‖2 ≤ 10
√
ml and ‖y′ − y‖2 ≤
√
2pi(1− α2)/(720α√ml).
By Lemma 3, we know that A(Wx) 6= A(Wy′). Thus, ∀y′ ∈ Rm with ‖y′‖2 = 1 and 〈x, y′〉 = α,
we have A(Wx) 6= A(Wy′) conditioned on E ′. By Lemma 2, we can conclude that ∀x′ ∈ Rm with
‖x′‖2 = 1 and 〈x, x′〉 ≤ α, we have A(Wx) 6= A(Wx′) conditioned on E ′.
Theorem 9 (A formal version of Theorem 1). Consider a weight matrix W ∈ Rl×m where each
entry is an i.i.d. sample drawn from the Gaussian distribution N(0, 1/l). Let γ ∈ (0, 0.48) be
the sparsity ratio of the activation function, i.e., γ = k/l. With probability at least 0.99, it has
∀i ∈ [l], ‖Wi‖2 ≤ 10
√
m. Condition on that ∀i ∈ [l], ‖Wi‖2 ≤ 10
√
m happens, then, for any
x ∈ Rm, if
l ≥ C ·
(
m+ log(1/δ)
γ
· 1
β
)
· log
(
m+ log(1/δ)
γ
· 1
β
)
for some β ∈ (0, 1) and a sufficiently large constant C, with probability at least 1 − δ · 2−m,
∀x′ ∈ Rm with ‖∆x‖22/‖x‖22 ≥ β, A(Wx) 6= A(Wx′), where x′ = c · (x+ ∆x) for some scaler c,
and ∆x is perpendicular to x.
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Proof. If 〈x, x′〉 ≤ 0, then the statement follows from Theorem 8 directly. In the following, we
consider the case 〈x, x′〉 > 0. If ‖∆x‖2/‖x‖22 ≥ β,
〈x, x′〉2
‖x‖22‖x′‖22
=
c2‖x‖42
‖x‖22(c2(‖x‖22 + ‖∆x‖22))
=
‖x‖22
‖x‖22 + ‖∆x‖22
≤ ‖x‖
2
2
‖x‖22 + β‖x‖22
≤ 1
1 + β
.
Thus,
1
1− 〈x,x′〉2‖x‖22‖x′‖22
≤ 1
β
+ 1 ≤ O
(
1
β
)
.
By Theorem 8, we conclude the proof.
Example 1. Suppose that the training data contains N points x1, x2, · · · , xN ∈ Rm (m ≥
Ω(logN)), where each entry of xi for i ∈ [N ] is an i.i.d. Bernoulli random variable, i.e., each entry
is 1 with some probability p ∈ (100 log(N)/m, 0.5) and 0 otherwise. Consider a weight matrix
W ∈ Rl×m where each entry is an i.i.d. sample drawn from the Gaussian distribution N(0, 1/l). Let
γ ∈ (0, 0.48) be the sparsity ratio of the activation function, i.e., γ = k/l. If l ≥ Ω(m/γ · log(m/γ)),
then with probability at least 0.9, ∀i, j ∈ [N ], the activation pattern of Wxi and Wxj are different,
i.e., A(Wxi) 6= A(Wxj).
Proof. Firstly, let us bound ‖xi‖2. We have E[‖xi‖22] = E [
∑m
t=1 xi,t] = pm. By Bernstein
inequality, we have
Pr
[∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
t=1
xi,t − pm
∣∣∣∣∣ > 110pm
]
≤ 2e−
(pm/10)2/2
pm+1
3
· 1
10
pm ≤ 0.01/N.
Thus, by taking union bound over all i ∈ [N ], with probability at least 0.99, ∀i ∈ [N ], √0.9pm ≤
‖xi‖2 ≤
√
1.1pm.
Next we consider 〈xi, xj〉. Notice that E[〈xi, xj〉] = E [
∑m
t=1 xi,txj,t] = p
2m. There are two cases.
Case 1 (p2m > 20 logN ). By Bernstein inequality, we have
Pr
[∣∣〈xi, xj〉 − p2m∣∣ > 1
2
p2m
]
≤ 2e−
(p2m/2)2/2
p2m+1
3
1
2
p2m = 2e−
3
28p
2m ≤ 0.01/N2.
By taking union bound over all pairs of i, j, with probability at least 0.99, ∀i 6= j, 〈xi, xj〉 ≤ 32p2m.
Since ‖xi‖2, ‖xj‖2 ≥
√
0.9pm, we have
〈xi, xj〉
‖xi‖2‖xj‖2 ≤
3p2m/2
0.9pm
=
5
3
p ≤ 5
6
.
Case 2 (p2m ≤ 20 logN ). By Bernstein inequality, we have
Pr
[∣∣〈xi, xj〉 − p2m∣∣ > 10 logN] ≤ 2e− (10 logN)2/2p2m+13 ·10 logN ≤ 0.01/N2.
By taking union bound over all pairs of i, j, with probability at least 0.99, ∀i 6= j, 〈xi, xj〉 ≤ 10 logN ,
Since ‖xi‖2, ‖xj‖2 ≥
√
0.9pm ≥ √90 logN , we have
〈xi, xj〉
‖xi‖2‖xj‖2 ≤
10 logN
90 logN
=
1
9
.
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Thus, with probability at least 0.98, we have ∀i 6= j, 〈xi, xj〉/(‖xi‖2‖xj‖2) ≤ 5/6. By Theorem 8,
with probability at least 0.99, ∀q ∈ [l], ‖Wq‖2 ≤ 10
√
m. Condition on this event, and since ∀i 6= j
we have 〈xi, xj〉/(‖xi‖2‖xj‖2) ≤ 5/6, by Theorem 8 again and union bound over all i ∈ [N ], with
probability at least 0.99, ∀i 6= j,A(Wxi) 6= A(Wxj).
D.2 Disjointness of Activation Patterns of Different Input Points
Let X1, X2, · · · , Xm be i.i.d. random variables drawn from the standard Gaussian distribution
N(0, 1). Let Z =
∑m
i=1X
2
i . We use the notation χ
2
m to denote the distribution of Z. If m is clear in
the context, we just use χ2 for short.
Lemma 8 (A property of χ2 distribution). Let Z be a random variable with χ2m m (m ≥ 2)
distribution. Given arbitrary ε, η ∈ (0, 1), if R is sufficiently large then
Pr[Z ≥ (1 + ε)R]/Pr[(1 + ε)R ≥ Z ≥ R] ≤ η.
Proof. Let R be a sufficiently large number such that:
• eεR/2 ≥ 4ε .
• eεR/8 ≥ Rm/2−1.
• eεR/4 ≥ 169 · 1η .
Let ξ = ε/4. By the density function of χ2 distribution, we have
Pr[R ≤ Z ≤ (1 + ε)R] = 1
2m/2Γ(m/2)
∫ (1+ε)R
R
tm/2−1e−t/2dt,
and
Pr[Z ≥ (1 + ε)R] = 1
2m/2Γ(m/2)
∫ ∞
(1+ε)R
tm/2−1e−t/2dt,
where Γ(·) is the Gamma function, and for integer m/2, Γ(m/2) = (m/2−1)(m/2−2) · · · ·2 ·1 =
(m/2− 1)!. By our choice of R, we have
Pr[R ≤ Z ≤ (1 + ε)R] ≥ 1
2m/2Γ(m/2)
∫ (1+ε)R
R
e−t/2dt
=
1
2m/2Γ(m/2)
· 2
(
e−R/2 − e−(1+ε)R/2
)
≥ 1
2m/2Γ(m/2)
· 2(1− ξ) · e−R/2,
where the first step follows from ∀t ≥ R, tm/2−1 ≥ 1, and the third step follows from
e−(1+ε)R/2
e−R/2
= e−εR/2 ≤ ξ.
We also have:
Pr[Z ≥ (1 + ε)R] ≤ 1
2m/2Γ(m/2)
∫ +∞
(1+ε)R
e−(1−ξ)t/2dt
=
1
2m/2Γ(m/2)
· 2
1− ξ · e
−(1−ξ)(1+ε)R/2
≤ 1
2m/2Γ(m/2)
· 2
1− ξ · e
−(1+ε/2)R/2,
where the first step follos from ∀t ≥ R, tm/2−1 ≤ eξt/2, and the third step follows from (1− ξ)(1 +
ε) ≥ (1 + ε/2).
Thus, we have
Pr[Z ≥ (1 + ε)R]
Pr[(1 + ε)R ≥ Z ≥ R] ≤
1
(1− ξ)2 e
−εR/4 ≤ 16
9
e−εR/4 ≤ η.
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Lemma 9. Consider x, y, z ∈ Rm. If 〈x,y〉‖x‖2‖y‖2 ≤ α,
〈x,z〉
‖x‖2‖z‖2 ≥ β for some α, β ≥ 0, then
〈y,z〉
‖y‖2‖z‖2 ≤ α +
√
1− β2. Furthermore, if β = 2+α+
√
2−α2
4 , then
〈y,z〉
‖y‖2‖z‖2 ≤ (1 − εα)β, where
εα ∈ (0, 1) only depends on α.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we suppose ‖x‖2 = ‖y‖2 = ‖z‖2 = 1. We can decompose y as
ax+ y′ where y′ is perpendicular to x. We can decompose z as b1x+ b2y′/‖y′‖2 + z′ where z′ is
perpendicular to both x and y′. Then we have:
〈y, z〉 = ab1 + b2‖y′‖2 ≤ α+
√
1− β2,
where the last inequality follows from 0 ≤ b1 ≤ 1, a ≤ α, and b2 ≤
√
1− b21 ≤
√
1− β2,
0 ≤ ‖y′‖2 ≤ 1.
By solving β ≥ α+
√
1− β2, we can get β ≥ α+
√
2−α2
2 . Thus, if we set
β =
1 + α+
√
2−α2
2
2
,
β should be strictly larger than α+
√
1− β2, and the gap only depends on α.
Lemma 10. Give x ∈ Rm, let y ∈ Rm be a random vector, where each entry of y is an
i.i.d. sample drawn from the standard Gaussian distribution N(0, 1). Given β ∈ (0.5, 1),
Pr[〈x, y〉/(‖x‖2‖y‖2) ≥ β] ≥ 1/(1 + 1/
√
2(1− β))m.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we can assume ‖x‖2 = 1. Let y′ = y/‖y‖2. Since each entry of y
is an i.i.d. Gaussian variable, y′ is a random vector drawn uniformly from a unit sphere. Notice that if
〈x, y′〉 ≥ β, then ‖x−y′‖2 ≤
√
2(1− β). Let C = {z ∈ Rm | ‖z‖2 = 1, ‖z−x‖2 ≤
√
2(1− β)}
be a cap, and let S = {z ∈ Rm | ‖z‖2 = 1} be the unit sphere. Then we have
Pr[〈x, y′〉 ≥ β] = area(C)/area(S).
According to Lemma 6, there is an
√
2(1− β)-net N with |N | ≤ (1 + 1/√2(1− β))m. If we put
a cap centered at each point in N , then the whole unit sphere will be covered. Thus, we can conclude
Pr[〈x, y′〉 ≥ β] ≥ 1/(1 + 1/
√
2(1− β))m.
Theorem 10 (A formal version of Theorem 2). Consider N data points x1, x2, · · · , xN ∈ Rm and
a weight matrix W ∈ Rl×m where each entry of W is an i.i.d. sample drawn from the Gaussian
distribution N(0, 1/l). Suppose ∀i 6= j ∈ [N ], 〈xi, xj〉/(‖xi‖2‖xj‖2) ≤ α for some α ∈ (0.5, 1).
Fix k ≥ 1 and δ ∈ (0, 1), if l is sufficiently large, then with probability at least 1− δ,
∀i, j ∈ [N ],A(Wxi) ∩ A(Wxj) = ∅.
Proof. Notice that the scale of W and x1, x2, · · · , xN do not affect either 〈xi, xj〉/(‖xi‖2‖xj‖2) or
the activation pattern. Thus, we can assume ‖x1‖2 = ‖x2‖2 = · · · = ‖xN‖2 = 1 and each entry of
W is an i.i.d. standard Gaussian random variable.
Let β = 2+α+
√
2−α2
4 and εα be the same as mentioned in Lemma 9. Set ε and β
′ as
ε =
1
β−1
2 , β
′ = (1 + ε)β.
Set
η =
δ/100
100k log(N/δ) · (1 + 2/√2(1− β′))m .
Let R satisfies
Pr
Z∼χ2m
[Z ≥ (1 + ε)2R2] = δ/100
l
.
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Due to Lemma 8, if l is sufficiently large, then R is sufficiently large such that
Pr
Z∼χ2m
[Z ≥ (1 + ε)2R2]/ Pr
Z∼χ2m
[(1 + ε)2R2 ≥ Z ≥ R2] ≤ η.
Notice that for t ∈ [l], ‖Wt‖22 is a random variable with χ2m distribution. Thus, Pr[‖Wt‖2 ≥
(1 + ε)R] = δ/100l . By taking union bound over all t ∈ [l], with probability at least 1 − δ/100,∀t ∈ [l], ‖Wt‖2 ≤ (1 + ε)R. In the remaining of the proof, we will condition on that ∀t ∈
[l], ‖Wt‖2 ≤ (1 + ε)R. Consider i, j ∈ [N ], t ∈ [l], if Wtxi > β′R, then we have
Wtxi
‖Wt‖2 >
β′R
(1 + ε)R
≥ β′/(1 + ε) = β.
Due to Lemma 9, we have
Wtxj
‖Wt‖2 < (1− εα)β.
Thus,
Wtxj < (1− εα)β‖Wt‖2 ≤ (1− εα)β(1 + ε)R ≤ (1− εα)β′R. (20)
Notice that for i ∈ [N ], t ∈ [l], we have
Pr[Wtxi > β
′R] ≥ Pr[‖Wt‖2 ≥ R] Pr
[
Wtxi
‖Wt‖2 ≥ β
′
]
≥ δ/100
l
· 1
η
· 1
(1 + 1/
√
2(1− β′))m
≥ 1
l
· 100k log(N/δ).
By Chernoff bound, with probability at least 1− δ/(100N),
l∑
t=1
1(Wtxi > β
′R) ≥ k.
By taking union bound over i ∈ [N ], with probability at least 1− δ/100, ∀i ∈ [N ],
l∑
t=1
1(Wtxi > β
′R) ≥ k.
This implies that ∀i ∈ [N ], if t ∈ A(Wxi), then Wtxi > β′R. Due to Equation (20), ∀j ∈ [N ], we
have Wtxj < β′R which implies that t 6∈ A(Wxj). Thus, with probability at least 1− δ/50 ≥ 1− δ
probability, ∀i 6= j, A(Wxi) ∩ A(Wxj) = ∅.
Remark 1. Consider any x1, x2, · · · , xN ∈ Rm with ‖x1‖2 = ‖x2‖2 = · · · = ‖xN‖2 = 1. If
∀i 6= j ∈ [N ], 〈xi, xj〉 ≤ α for some α ∈ (0.5, 1), then |N | ≤ (1 + 2/
√
2(1− α))m.
Proof. Since 〈xi, xj〉 ≤ α, ‖xi − xj‖22 = ‖xi‖22 + ‖xj‖22 − 2〈xi, xj〉 ≥ 2− 2α. Let S be the unit
sphere, i.e., S = {x ∈ Rm | ‖x‖2 = 1}. Due to Lemma 6, there is a (
√
2(1− α)/2)-net N of S
with size at most |N | ≤ (1 + 2/√2(1− α))m. Consider xi, xj , and y ∈ N . By triangle inequality,
if ‖xi − y‖2 <
√
2(1− α)/2, then ‖xj − y‖2 >
√
2(1− α)/2 due to ‖xi − xj‖2 ≥
√
2(1− α).
Since N is a net of S , for each xi, we can find a y ∈ N such that ‖xi − y‖2 <
√
2(1− α)/2. Thus,
we can conclude N ≤ |N | ≤ (1 + 2/√2(1− α))m.
Theorem 11. Consider N data points x1, x2, · · · , xN ∈ Rm with their corresponding labels
z1, z2, · · · , zN ∈ R and a weight matrixW ∈ Rl×m where each entry ofW is an i.i.d. sample drawn
from the Gaussian distribution N(0, 1/l). Suppose ∀i 6= j ∈ [N ], 〈xi, xj〉/(‖xi‖2‖xj‖2) ≤ α for
some α ∈ (0.5, 1). Fix k ≥ 1 and δ ∈ (0, 1), if l is sufficiently large, then with probability at least
1− δ, there exists a vector v ∈ Rl such that
∀i ∈ [N ], 〈v, φk(Wxi)〉 = zi.
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Proof. Due to Theorem 10, with probability at least 1 − δ, ∀i 6= j, A(Wxi) ∩ A(Wxj) = ∅. Let
t1, t2, · · · , tN ∈ [l] such that ti ∈ A(Wxi). Then ti 6∈ A(Wxj) for j 6= i.
For each entry vt, if t = ti for some i ∈ [N ], then set vt = zi/(Wtxi). Then for i ∈ [N ], we have
〈v, φk(Wxi)〉 =
∑
t∈A(Wxi)
vt ·Wtxi = zi/(Wtixi) ·Wtixi = zi.
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